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Mortgage Modification and Strategic Behavior:  
Evidence from a Legal Settlement with Countrywide †
By Christopher Mayer, Edward Morrison,  
Tomasz Piskorski, and Arpit Gupta *
We investigate whether homeowners respond strategically to news 
of mortgage modification programs. We exploit plausibly exogenous 
variation in modification policy induced by settlement of US state 
government lawsuits against Countrywide Financial Corporation, 
which agreed to offer modifications to seriously delinquent bor-
rowers. Using a difference-in-differences framework, we find that 
Countrywide’s monthly delinquency rate increased more than 
0.54 percentage points—a 10 percent relative increase—immedi-
ately after the settlement’s announcement. The estimated increase 
in default rates is largest among borrowers least likely to default 
otherwise. These results suggest that strategic behavior should be 
an important consideration in designing mortgage modification pro-
grams. (JEL D14, G21, K22, R31)
Debt relief programs have a long history and have attracted renewed interest dur-
ing the recent financial crisis, which has seen millions of US homeowners lose their 
homes to foreclosure since 2007. The potential benefits and costs of these programs 
are well known. During a crisis, mortgage debt relief can prevent excessive fore-
closures, which yield losses for both borrowers and lenders and may also generate 
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negative externalities for surrounding communities.1 Debt relief could also have 
macroeconomic benefits to the extent that high household leverage depresses aggre-
gate consumption and employment, as Mian and Sufi (2012) show. On the other 
hand, debt relief can distort the incentives of homeowners, who may default on 
mortgages in order to qualify for relief even though they could continue making 
debt payments. Strategic behavior like this not only increases the cost of debt relief 
programs to the lenders, but may also raise the long-run price of credit, if borrowers 
and lenders anticipate future debt relief programs.
Despite the economic importance of debt relief programs, there is little empirical 
evidence on their effects. This paper presents evidence on their costs. We study a 
recent mortgage modification program with a simple eligibility criterion—borrow-
ers in default qualified—and estimate the extent to which the program affected bor-
rower incentives to default.
Our focus is motivated by a key trade-off in the design of debt relief programs. 
In principle, a cost-effective program should apply eligibility criteria that efficiently 
identify homeowners who are highly likely to default unless they receive relief. 
In practice, it is costly and difficult to identify these at-risk homeowners because 
homeowner default decisions can depend on hard-to-observe factors such as their 
financial ability to service debt, private valuation of their homes, and personal 
default costs.
One approach to the problem is to offer benefits only to homeowners who com-
plete a rigorous audit that verifies that they are likely to default, or have defaulted, as 
a result of meaningful adverse conditions.2 Such an audit, for example, would assess 
the home’s value and the homeowner’s current income and credit rating. Because 
this approach can be time-consuming and can induce screening costs, it may fail to 
extend benefits to homeowners before they enter foreclosure or decide to exit their 
homes, and could thereby lead to higher costs for borrowers, lenders, and surround-
ing communities. An alternative way to target modification benefits is to extend 
help only to homeowners who are delinquent.3 While this approach is possibly 
quicker and less expensive in terms of screening costs, it could induce homeowners 
to default in order to obtain modification benefits. Such induced defaults can raise 
the costs of these programs for lenders because the borrowers may have continued 
repaying their loans without any concessions.
A key factor affecting this trade-off, at least from the perspective of lenders (or 
mortgage investors), is the extent to which simple delinquency requirements encour-
age borrowers to default on their loans. This has been an open empirical question 
1 Several papers explore the potential benefits of debt relief to both borrowers and lenders during adverse eco-
nomic conditions, including Bolton and Rosenthal (2002); Kroszner (2003); and Piskorski and Tchistyi (2011). 
Because foreclosures may exert significant negative externalities (see, for example, Campbell, Giglio, and Pathak 
2011 and Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi 2011), it may be socially optimal to modify mortgage contracts to a greater extent 
than lenders would select independently.
2 An example of this approach is the Home Affordable Modification Program, introduced in March 2009, which 
contains multiple eligibility requirements, along with a trial period preceding any permanent modification (see 
Agarwal et al. 2012).
3 For example, a number of recent modification programs have made benefits available to homeowners who 
failed to make at least two monthly mortgage payments (e.g., the Bank of America/Countrywide Modification 
Program). Other programs, like the IndyMac/FDIC Program, JP Chase Enhanced Program, Citi Homeownership 
Preservation Program, and GSE Streamlined Modification Program have also targeted seriously delinquent borrow-
ers, though some include additional eligibility requirements. See Citigroup (2009).
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as mortgage default can result in additional costs for the borrower. Seriously delin-
quent borrowers, for example, face higher costs of accessing credit in the future. 
Additionally, bounded rationality or moral considerations may further decrease the 
ability and willingness of borrowers to default on their loans to profit from debt 
relief polices (see, for example, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2013).
To investigate this question, we focus on a legal settlement with Countrywide 
Financial Corporation. In October 2008, Countrywide announced that it had settled 
suits filed by US state attorneys general. It agreed to extend offers of loan modifica-
tions, beginning December 2008, to all borrowers who had Countrywide-serviced 
subprime mortgages and were at least 60 days past due on payments. Three features 
of the Countrywide settlement—its unexpected public announcement in advance 
of its implementation, nationwide coverage, and the requirement that a borrower 
be delinquent in order to receive benefits—make it a potentially useful setting for 
assessing borrower behavior in response to the offer of mortgage modification fea-
turing a simple delinquency requirement.
We examine strategic behavior after the Countrywide announcement using 
 loan-level data matched to borrower credit histories. We say that a borrower exhibits 
“strategic behavior” if he or she defaults in response to public announcement of the 
settlement and would not have defaulted otherwise, at least in the near term. We 
focus on a particular measure of the default rate: the rate at which previously-current 
borrowers miss two payments in a row. These borrowers are said to “roll straight” 
from current to 60 days delinquent. We focus on this measure of default—the “roll-
over rate”—because the Countrywide program targeted borrowers who were at least 
60 days delinquent. In a difference-in-difference framework, we estimate the change 
in this delinquency rate among Countrywide borrowers during the months imme-
diately following the settlement announcement relative to the change during the 
same period among comparable borrowers who were unaffected by the settlement 
because their loans were not serviced by Countrywide.
We find that the settlement induced a 0.54 percentage point increase in the 
monthly rollover rate among Countrywide borrowers—a 10 percent increase 
relative to the pre-settlement rate (4.8 percent)—during the three months imme-
diately after the settlement announcement. The effect of the settlement is even 
larger—a 16 to 18 percent increase relative to the pre-settlement rollover rate—
when we subset on borrowers with (i) substantial available credit through credit 
cards and (ii) lower current combined loan-to-value (CLTV) ratios. These bor-
rowers were arguably less likely to default in the near term because they had 
significant untapped liquidity through credit cards or some positive equity in 
their homes.
We confirm that these results are not driven by idiosyncratic features of 
Countrywide loans or borrowers. Although we observe an increase in relative 
default rates among Countrywide loans targeted by the settlement (subprime first 
lien mortgages), we do not observe an increase in relative default rates among 
loans not targeted by the settlement. Default rates on credit cards and second 
mortgages held by Countrywide borrowers did not increase relative to default 
rates among control group borrowers. Nor do we observe an increase in rela-
tive default rates among non-subprime fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) held by 
Countrywide borrowers.
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Together, these results inform ongoing discussions about the trade-off between 
quickly implemented programs with simple but possibly manipulable eligibil-
ity criteria and slowly implemented programs with more rigorous verification of 
homeowner distress. Further research is needed to determine whether the costs of 
strategic behavior are large relative to the potential benefits of a simple modification 
program that quickly extends benefits to a large number of homeowners.
Previous studies of incentives and strategic behavior in the context of the recent 
crisis have examined a number of questions, including the impact of bailouts and 
regulatory design on banks’ incentives to take risk,4 the likelihood that some lend-
ers originated mortgages with greater risk due to their ability to sell the loans in 
the securitization market,5 and the impact of securitization on servicer decisions to 
foreclose or renegotiate delinquent loans.6 Little attention has been given so far to 
strategic behavior among homeowners.
Our analysis is also broadly connected to the household finance literature, sur-
veyed by Campbell (2006) and Tufano (2009), especially the recent empirical 
literature examining household motives behind mortgage defaults. Most of this 
recent literature aims to assesses the relative importance of two key drivers of 
mortgage default: negative equity and illiquidity.7 Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 
(2013) also explore how moral and social considerations affect the decision to 
default on a mortgage. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to 
assess the effect of mortgage modification programs on incentives to default on 
a mortgage. Our paper is also related to the empirical literature examining the 
effects of various policies on household behavior, such as the impact of unemploy-
ment insurance on workers’ incentives to work.8 We contribute to this literature by 
examining the effects of mortgage modification policy on borrowers’ incentives 
to repay their loans. Finally, our paper helps inform the empirical literature on 
contract renegotiation.9
The reminder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section I we describe the 
Countrywide settlement and our hypotheses regarding its effects on homeowner 
behavior. Sections II and III describe our data and empirical methodology. We pres-
ent our results in Section IV and discuss their implications for mortgage modifica-
tion policies in Section V.
4 See Farhi and Tirole (2012) and Poole (2009), for example, for the analysis of bailouts. See Agarwal et al. 
(forthcoming) who examine differences between federal and state regulators and their impact on banks’ decisions.
5 Mian and Sufi (2009); Keys, et al. (2010); Keys, Seru, and Vig (2012); Rajan, Seru, and Vig (2010); Berndt and 
Gupta (2009); and Purnanandam (2011) provide evidence suggesting that originators might have made riskier loans 
when they were able to securitize these loans.
6 Piskorski, Seru, and Vig (2010) show that bank-held delinquent loans were foreclosed at a lower rate relative 
to comparable mortgages that were securitized. Agarwal et al. (2011) corroborate their findings and provide further 
evidence that bank-held loans were much more likely to be renegotiated than comparable securitized mortgages.
7 See, among others, Foote, Gerardi, and Willen (2008); Cohen-Cole and Morse (2010); and Elul et al. (2010). 
See also Mian and Sufi (2011) who examine the role of the home equity-based borrowing channel in the recent 
crisis using a dataset consisting of individual credit files.
8 See, for example, Meyer (1990) and Krueger and Meyer (2002).
9 See, among others, recent research by Benmelech and Bergman (2008) and Roberts and Sufi (2009) in the 
context of corporate default, and Matvos (2013) for renegotiation in NFL football contracts.
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I. Countrywide Settlement and Hypotheses
A. The Settlement
In June 2008, attorneys general in California and Illinois sued Countrywide, alleg-
ing deceptive lending practices. The California complaint, for example, alleged that 
Countrywide had “implemented [a] deceptive scheme through misleading marketing 
practices designed to sell risky and costly loans to homeowners, the terms and dan-
gers of which they did not understand.”10 Over the next three months, similar suits 
were brought by attorneys general in over 30 other states.
On October 6, 2008, Countrywide entered a multi-state settlement, pursuant to 
which it agreed to extend offers of loan modification to all seriously delinquent 
or near-delinquent subprime first-mortgage loans11 that it services throughout 
the nation.12 It was irrelevant whether the loan was originated by Countrywide, 
whether it was securitized or held in Countrywide’s portfolio,13 whether it previ-
ously received a modification, or whether the borrower’s home was encumbered by 
a second mortgage or junior lien.
The settlement targeted subprime first mortgages serviced by Countrywide, includ-
ing hybrid ARMs and Option ARMs. To qualify for modification, the mortgage and 
borrower had to satisfy four criteria: The loan must have been originated before 
2008 and have been within Countrywide’s servicing portfolio on June 30, 2008; the 
borrower’s loan-to-value ratio (LTV) must be at least 75 percent; payments of prin-
cipal or interest must be 60 or more days delinquent (or likely to become delinquent 
as a result of an interest rate reset or negative amortization trigger); and the bor-
rower’s post-modification mortgage payments must not exceed certain thresholds. 
The program was scheduled to last until June 30, 2012.
With respect to subprime hybrid ARMs, which are the primary focus of this paper, 
seriously delinquent borrowers would be considered for unsolicited restoration of 
the introductory interest rate for five years. Additionally, all seriously delinquent 
Hybrid ARM borrowers would be considered for some type of fully-amortizing loan 
modification. One type would reduce the interest rate for five years (to as low as 
3.5 percent), after which the loan would be converted to an FRM at a low rate.
Countrywide agreed to be proactive in contacting borrowers eligible for modifica-
tions under the settlement. Although it made this commitment on October 6, 2008, 
it announced that it would not be ready to contact borrowers during the first few 
10 See State of California (2008a) and State of Illinois (2008).
11 The settlement defined a subprime first mortgage as one that “is identified as such in connection with a secu-
ritization in which it is part of the pool of securitized assets or, in the case of a [Countrywide] Residential Mortgage 
Loan that is not included in a securitization, was classified as being ‘subprime’ on the systems of [Countrywide] and 
its subsidiaries on June 30, 2008. ‘Subprime Mortgage Loans’ do not include first-lien residential mortgage loans 
that are Federal Eligible.” See Countrywide Financial Corporation (2008).
12 A summary of the settlement is provided by a “Multistate Settlement Term Sheet” (see Countrywide Financial 
Corporation 2008). More detailed terms are provided by State of California (2008b), among other sources.
13 Although securitization agreements often limit the servicer’s authority to modify mortgages (see Mayer, 
Morrison, and Piskorski 2009 and Piskorski, Seru, and Vig 2010), Countrywide stated, “it currently has, or reason-
ably expects to obtain, discretion to pursue the foreclosure avoidance measures outlined in this agreement for the 
substantial majority of Qualifying Mortgages. Where [Countrywide] does not enjoy discretion to pursue these fore-
closure avoidance measures, [Countrywide] will use its best effort to seek appropriate authorization from investors.” 
See Countrywide Financial Corporation (2008).
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months of the program. Countrywide also agreed to temporarily suspend the fore-
closure process for any borrower eligible for modification. 
B. Public Awareness of the Settlement
The Countrywide settlement was widely reported in early October 2008, prior to 
its nationwide rollout in December 2008. Figure 1 documents the sudden interest in 
the settlement during this period: As reported by Google Trends, Internet searches 
for the term “Countrywide Modification” spiked in October, as newspapers around 
the country announced the settlement. Search activity dramatically increased just 
after this date.
Internet discussion forums also show that at least some Countrywide borrowers 
were aware that the settlement targeted borrowers who were at least 60 days delin-
quent. In one forum, borrowers report that they were in touch with Countrywide as 
early as October 2008 regarding their eligibility and were told that benefits were 
available to borrowers who were 60 days delinquent. Some forum participants also 
indicate that they responded to the settlement by missing mortgage payments in 
order to qualify for benefits.14
14 The information reported in this paragraph is drawn from comments posted at http://loanworkout.org/2009/02/
countrywide-idiots/. This site includes statements such as: “We started the process back in Oct of 2008. We have 
an ARM with a 8.75 percent rate currently. We have applied for a rate reductions but were told we would have 
to be delinquent on our account to qualify.” “We received a loan modification agreement in December, but this 
was after we were told not to make a mortgage payment, because if we made a payment and we were current we 
would not qualify.” “In order to get the help we were requesting, we had to go from having an excellent pay history 
Oct. 6, 2008 
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Figure 1. Internet Searches for “Countrywide Modification”
Notes: This figure plots an index of the weekly volume of Internet searches for the term 
“Countrywide Modification,” as reported by Google Trends. Searches for this term spiked on 
October 6, 2008 the day the Countrywide settlement was announced and reported by newspa-
pers around the country.
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Countrywide was aware of the potential for strategic behavior. Its settlement 
included a provision stating that, if it “detects material levels of intentional non-
performance by borrowers that appears to be attributable to the introduction of the 
loan modification program, it reserves the right to require objective prequalification 
of borrowers for loan modifications under the program and to take other reason-
able steps.” It appears that this provision was not widely reported and may not have 
deterred some homeowners from strategically defaulting on their mortgages in order 
to qualify for modifications.
C. Hypotheses
We view the settlement as an opportunity to assess homeowner response to sudden 
announcement of a modification policy using simple but manipulable qualification 
criteria. Most of our analysis focuses on 2/28 ARMs, a type of loan primarily tar-
geted by the settlement and very common among subprime borrowers (see Mayer, 
Pence, and Sherlund 2009). These mortgages offer an introductory “teaser” rate 
for the first two years, after which the rate resets to a possibly higher level for the 
remaining 28 years of the loan term.
Assuming the announcement was an exogenous shock—an assumption we jus-
tify in the next section—we propose the following differences-in-differences (DD) 
estimation strategy: Relative to the same type of mortgages held by comparable bor-
rowers and serviced by other servicers, were Countrywide 2/28 ARMs more likely 
to “roll straight” from current to 60 days delinquent—i.e., abruptly stop payment 
for two months—during the period immediately after public announcement of the 
settlement? By abruptly stopping payment, homeowners could make themselves 
eligible for the benefits of the settlement.
We test for this DD effect beginning in October 2008, the month of the settle-
ment announcement. There is, however, a potential confound beginning in early 
2009. In February of that year the federal government announced plans to imple-
ment a widespread modification program, the Home Affordable Mortgage Plan 
(HAMP), which went online in March 2009. It is a potential confound because its 
effect on Countrywide borrowers, who may have already applied for or obtained 
modifications pursuant to the Countrywide settlement, may differ from its effect 
on non-Countrywide borrowers. Additionally, Countrywide borrowers may have 
suspended their response to the settlement because they expected the forthcom-
ing federal program to be more generous.15 To avoid this potential confound, we 
focus our analysis on the behavior of borrowers during the first few months after 
the settlement announcement (October 2008 to February 2009), paying particular 
attention to their behavior during the first quarter of the program (October 2008 to 
December 2009).
to  completely tarnishing our record by missing two months of payments … so we skipped our payments for two 
months.” “We would not even be behind if they did not advise us to enter into the loan modification and not send 
any payments in until it was approved or denied!”
15 The HAMP guidelines do not have any specific requirement that a loan must to be delinquent to be eligible. 
In fact, the program provides additional financial incentives to servicers to modify loans that are currently making 
payments (but are at risk of default in the future). See Agarwal et al. (2012).
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To be sure, the settlement announcement may have convinced some borrowers 
to default slightly earlier than they would have otherwise. These defaults are not 
 strategic because the borrowers were already distressed and likely to default. To 
assess whether economic distress—rather than strategic behavior—is driving excess 
post-settlement defaults among Countrywide borrowers (relative to the control 
group), we examine the behavior of homeowners who were least likely to default 
when the settlement was announced: (i) homeowners with substantial available 
credit on their credit cards (equal to at least five times their monthly mortgage pay-
ment) and (ii) homeowners with relatively low current CLTV ratios. Because these 
homeowners had access to significant amounts of additional liquidity, or might have 
had positive home equity, they were less likely to default in the absence of a modi-
fication program, at least in the near future. If we observe a relative rise in rollover 
rates among these homeowners, we think it is suggestive of strategic behavior by 
those impacted by the settlement, rather than changes in other economic factors that 
might be coincident with announcement of the settlement.
As an additional test of strategic behavior, we examine the behavior of home-
owners with respect to debts that were not targeted by the settlement, including 
second mortgages and credit cards. If strategic behavior—not economic distress—
induced excess defaults on Countrywide subprime first mortgages, we do not expect 
to observe excess defaults (relative to the control group) with respect to nontargeted 
debts during the period immediately after the settlement announcement.
Finally, we consider the behavior of borrowers with FRMs. While hybrid ARMs 
are a risky mortgage product usually targeted at subprime borrowers, FRMs are 
a more conventional mortgage product that are often taken out by more credit-
worthy (non-subprime) borrowers who would not have qualified for modifica-
tion under the settlement. Hence, we do not expect to observe a response among 
 non-subprime FRMs. We can therefore assess whether the post-settlement increase 
in Countrywide’s rollover rate (relative to the control group) reflects strategic behav-
ior among targeted borrowers (those with hybrid ARMs) or just a generalized rise in 
default rates across all Countrywide borrowers, including nontargeted homeowners 
(those with non-subprime FRMs).
II. Data
We use a match between two databases: (i) loan-level mortgage data collected 
by BlackBox Logic and (ii) borrower-level credit report information collected by 
Equifax. BlackBox is a private company that provides a comprehensive, dynamic 
dataset with information about 21 million privately securitized subprime, Alt-A, 
and prime loans originated after 1999. These loans account for about 90 percent of 
all privately securitized mortgages from that period. The BlackBox data, which are 
obtained from mortgage servicers and securitization trustees, include static infor-
mation taken at the time of origination, such as mortgage date and amount, FICO 
credit score, servicer name, interest rate, term, and interest rate type. The BlackBox 
data also include dynamic data on monthly payments, mortgage balances, and delin-
quency status.
Equifax is a credit reporting agency that provides monthly data on borrowers’ 
current credit scores, payments and balances on mortgage and installment debt, and 
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 balances and credit utilization for revolving debt (such as credit cards and HELOCs). 
Equifax reports the “Vantage” credit score, which is comparable to FICO and ranges 
from 501 to 990.
The match between BlackBox and Equifax data was performed by 1010Data, a 
provider of data warehousing and processing, using a proprietary match algorithm. 
We impose four restrictions on the merged BlackBox-Equifax data in order to create 
a “base sample.” First, we restrict the data to the types of loans that might have been 
eligible for the Countrywide settlement, namely first-lien mortgages on residential 
properties that were the owners’ primary residences. First-liens were identified as 
loans with the following characteristics in the BlackBox dataset: (i) a lien type of 
“first” and (ii) a current or origination mortgage balance that was within 5 percent 
of the current or origination balance reported for the largest two first mortgages in 
the Equifax dataset. Second, we retain only loans that were originated during 2005, 
2006, and the first half of 2007 because we have access to Equifax data covering 
these originations. Third, we exclude mortgages with an origination LTV less than 
seventy. Borrowers with lower LTVs are unlikely to have been subprime borrow-
ers at the time of origination. Finally, we exclude mortgages serviced by Citibank, 
IndyMac, and J.P. Morgan, all of which implemented modification programs around 
the time that the settlement was announced. We are interested in comparing the 
behavior of Countrywide borrowers to that of similar borrowers who were not 
offered modification benefits around the time of the announcement. After imposing 
these restrictions, we obtain a base sample that includes more than 500,000 2/28 
ARMs and more than 700,000 FRMs.
Although 1010Data was able to link nearly all BlackBox mortgages to Equifax 
credit reports, we took steps to reduce the likelihood of poor-quality linkages by 
creating a “matched sample” on which we perform all analysis involving Equifax 
covariates. We exclude from the matched sample any observation for which the 
borrower zip code reported in Equifax does not match the property zip code in the 
BlackBox dataset. This exclusion omits mismatched loans at the level of zip code 
and provides additional verification that owner-occupants held the loans in our sam-
ple.16 Due to these restrictions, the matched sample is smaller than the base sample 
and includes more than 300,000 2/28 ARMs and more than 450,000 FRMs.
Because the Equifax data include information about current balances on other 
junior mortgages held by the borrower, we are able to compute an initial combined 
loan-to-value (CLTV) ratio for each property. We can then estimate current CLTV at 
any point of time using zip-level home price indices provided by Zillow.17
In the analysis below, we report results both for the full base sample as well as the 
smaller matched sample. Variables provided by Equifax are used as covariates only 
in the matched sample.
16 We have conducted an extensive comparison of merge quality between the datasets in the matched sample, 
checking fields such as dynamic payment history, origination balance, and origination dates. We find that these 
fields match very closely across the two databases, providing additional verification of merge quality.
17 For both the base and matched samples, we use the MAPLE/Geocorr2k engine provided by the Missouri 
Census to link property zip code to metropolitan statistical areas. We compute the current CLTV of a loan as a 
ratio of combined outstanding loan balances to the current estimated house value (a house price at loan origination 
indexed by cumulative change of zip code house price index).
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III. Methodology
We estimate a probit specification of the following form:
(1) Pr ( Y it = 1 | Curren t it−2 ) = Φ(C W it β + Oct-De c it μ + C W it Oct-De c it δ +  x it ′ γ).
The dependent variable is the probability that a mortgage becomes 60 days past 
due in month t ( Y it = 1), conditional upon being current 60 days (two months) ear-
lier (Curren t it−2 ). We call this the “rollover rate”: the rate at which borrowers “roll 
straight” from current to 60 days delinquent. It is our primary dependent variable 
for three reasons: (i) the settlement targeted borrowers who were at least 60 days 
delinquent; (ii) evidence of strategic behavior is more compelling if we observe an 
abrupt increase in defaults among borrowers who were current on payments prior 
to the settlement announcement; and (iii) by conditioning on loans that were previ-
ously current, we study transition rates among a relatively homogeneous group of 
loans. We confirm, however, that our results are similar when we consider a standard 
hazard model (see Section IVE).
In the above specification, C W it is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the loan is 
serviced by Countrywide. Oct-De c it is another dummy, equaling 1 if month t occurs 
during the period October through December 2008. October 2008 is the first month 
during which we could observe a borrower response to announcement of the settle-
ment on October 6, 2008.18  x it is a vector of loan and borrower characteristics that 
includes variables such as initial Vantage score and the change in Vantage score from 
origination to the current period, initial and current CLTV, origination quarter, initial 
and current interest rate, loan balance, controls for date of reset, dummies for each 
quarter before and after the settlement announcement, interactions between these 
time dummies and the Countrywide indicator (C W it ), and a constant term. Standard 
errors are clustered by mortgage, but we confirm that we obtain comparable results 
when they are clustered by location (MSA) of the property backing the loan.19
In baseline models, we estimate the above specification on monthly data from July 
2007 through February 2009. July 2007 roughly marks the start of the subprime cri-
sis and the end of both subprime originations and the opportunity to refinance such 
mortgages. Thus, all mortgages in our study have been originated by July 2007.20 
This allows us to focus on a simple transition of mortgages from current status to 
default.21 We end our analysis period in February 2009 to avoid the potential con-
found arising from HAMP, but our core results do not change when we extend our 
analysis to include periods after February 2009 (see Section IVE).
The key coefficient of interest is δ, which measures the  difference-in-differences—
the estimated change in the difference between Countrywide and control group 
18 Our data record the payment status of the borrower as of the end of a given month. For example, a borrower 
who is 30 days delinquent in September will be recorded as being 60 days delinquent in October if no new payments 
were received by the end of October.
19 See Tables A.3 and A.4 in the online Appendix.
20 The majority of mortgages enter our data during 2006 and the first half of 2007.
21 A competing hazard model would be needed for data prior to July 2007. Such a model would be more complex 
to implement because distressed borrowers could use the refinancing option as an alternative to default. Moreover, 
the model might need to account for a possible structural shift in parameter values after the collapse of the subprime 
refinancing market in 2007.
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rollover rates during the quarter immediately after the settlement announcement 
(Oct–Dec 2008) relative to the first quarter in our analysis period (Jul–Sep 2007). 
We omit the first quarter of our sample because our empirical model includes interac-
tions between the Countrywide dummy and time dummies for each quarter (or two-
month period) prior to and after the settlement. The coefficients for these interactions 
trace out the time path of differences between Countrywide and control group delin-
quency rates. By choosing the first quarter as the omitted category, we make it easier 
to detect differential trends in pre-settlement delinquency rates. This is important 
because our identification assumption is that, in the absence of the settlement, obser-
vationally similar Countrywide and control group mortgages would display similar 
default patterns (up to a constant difference) during the period of study.
A. Comparability of Countrywide and Control Group Loans
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the stock of 2/28 ARMs at loan origina-
tion and in September 2008, the month before public announcement of the settle-
ment. Measured at means, Countrywide and control group loans are comparable: 
origination and current CLTV differ by at most 2 percentage points, origination and 
current interest rates differ by at most 11 basis points, and origination FICO and cur-
rent Vantage differ by at most 1 point. Origination balances differ by about $10,000, 
less than 10 percent of the standard deviation. Available  utilization on credit cards is 
measured as a fraction of the total credit limit available on all credit cards that have 
been used by the borrower. Table 1 shows similar levels of credit card utilization 
across the two groups of loans.
Table 1—Summary Statistics for 2/28 ARMs
Countrywide Control group
Number of loans 43,418 203,960
Mean SD Mean SD
Panel A. BlackBox variables
Initial CLTV 92 8.8 90 8.9
Initial interest rate 8.18 1.28 8.07 1.24
Current interest rate 8.63 1.35 8.56 1.37
Origination FICO 618 54 617 56.3
Origination balance 196 114 206 133
Low/no doc 0.42 0.49 0.6 0.49
Refi 0.055 0.23 0.1 0.3
Cash out refi 0.39 0.49 0.37 0.48
Panel B. Equifax variables
Current CLTV 121 28 119 28
Current Vantage 667 82 666 84
2nd lien balance 47.9 31.4 52.4 38.4
Has junior lien 0.44 0.5 0.38 0.48
Credit utilization 0.47 0.37 0.47 0.37
Notes: This table presents summary statistics for 2/28 adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) ser-
viced by Countrywide and the control group in the matched sample as of September 2008. The 
summary statistics include characteristics of these loans at origination and as of September 
2008, the month before public announcement of the settlement on October 6, 2008. CLTV 
and interest rates are reported in percentage terms; loan balances are in thousands of dollars.
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Figures 2 and 3 show kernel density plots, comparing the distributions of loan terms 
for Countrywide and control group loans at two points in time—at the beginning of 
our sample (July 2007) and during the month before the settlement announcement 
(September 2008). The distribution of loan characteristics is virtually identical for 
the two groups in July 2007, but in September 2008 we see a difference in the tails: 
Countrywide mortgages include a slightly greater proportion of higher-risk loans as 
manifested by their high CLTVs and interest rates.
We explore our identifying assumption further for 2/28 ARMs by tracking the 
evolution by month of current interest rates, Vantage scores, and CLTV among 2/28 
ARMs (see Figure A.1 in the online Appendix). Measured at means, Countrywide 
and control group loans display current interest rates, Vantage scores, and CLTVs 
that generally track each other closely prior to the settlement announcement.22 
However, some differences emerge in the last few months before the announce-
ment. Most notably, a difference in current CLTV begins to emerge in the last few 
22 We also verify that default rates among Countrywide and control group loans follow similar trends prior to 
our estimation period (July 2007 through February 2009). Between mid-2006 and mid-2007 about 7.2 percent of 
Countrywide and 7.6 percent of control group loans had entered default (Figure A.2 in the online Appendix).
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Figure 2. Comparability of Countrywide and Control Group: 
Kernel Density of Observables, July 2007
Notes: This figure shows the kernel density plots as of July 2007 for mortgage interest rate (panel A), Vantage credit 
score (panel B), and CLTV (panel C) for 2/28 ARMs in the matched sample. The solid line shows the Countrywide 
loans while the dashed line shows the corresponding values for mortgages in the control group.
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months before the announcement. This is consistent with Figure 3, which shows 
that Countrywide loans include a greater proportion of loans with extreme-valued 
CLTVs just before the settlement announcement.
We obtain similar inferences for non-subprime FRMs (see Table A1 in the online 
Appendix). We define a loan as non-subprime if the borrower’s origination FICO 
was more than 620.23 Non-subprime FRMs are comparable across most dimensions, 
including origination and current CLTV, origination FICO and current Vantage, origi-
nation balance, and credit card utilization. Some differences exist with respect to inter-
est rates, with average interest rate being 30 basis points lower for Countrywide loans.
Overall, this analysis shows that the mean characteristics of Countrywide and con-
trol group were comparable prior to the settlement, but that Countrywide loans have 
a relatively larger share of risky tail loans. This reflects the fact that Countrywide 
loans include a greater proportion of mortgages that were originated in areas where 
house prices declined most steeply during the crisis and that were often extended to 
23 Subprime status is difficult to define because there is no single agreed-upon definition. In order to be conser-
vative, we define an FRM as non-subprime if the borrower’s origination FICO was greater than 620, a common 
threshold for subprime status. Most lenders define a borrower as subprime if the borrower’s FICO credit score is 
below 620 on a scale that ranges from 300 to 850. This is also how the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
defines subprime status in their mortgage metrics reports (see Keys et al. 2010).
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Figure 3. Comparability of Countrywide and Control Group: 
Kernel Density of Observables, September 2008
Notes: This figure shows the kernel density plots as of September 2008 for mortgage interest rate (panel A), Vantage 
credit score (panel B), and CLTV (panel C) for 2/28 ARMs in the matched sample. The solid line shows the 
Countrywide loans while the dashed line shows the corresponding values for mortgages in the control group.
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high-risk borrowers, as reflected by their higher interest rates. Because some varia-
tion in default rates between Countrywide and control group loans could be due to 
differences in the mix of mortgages originated, we include a wide range of controls 
for loan, borrower, and regional characteristics in the regressions reported below. 
We also test whether our results vary when we subset on a relatively homogeneous 
subset of loans that excludes high-risk mortgages.24
IV. Results
A. Evolution of Default Rates
Figure 4 plots the average monthly rollover rate for Countrywide and control 
group loans during the five quarters preceding the settlement announcement, the 
quarter just after the announcement (Oct–Dec 2008), and the Jan–Feb 2009 period. 
Panel A examines all loans. Panel B subsets on low utilization borrowers, defined as 
those who had sufficiently large liquidity available to them through credit cards that 
they could charge the equivalent of five or more months of mortgage payments when 
they become delinquent on their mortgages. Panel C subsets on borrowers whose 
mortgages had a CLTV less then 100 percent at the time of their delinquency. These 
low credit utilization and low CLTV borrowers were arguably less likely to default 
in the near term because they had significant untapped liquidity through their credit 
cards or some positive equity in their homes.
Panel A of Figure 4 shows a significant increase in the rollover rate of Countrywide 
loans relative to the control group during the Oct–Dec 2008 period, the first quarter 
during which we could observe an effect of the settlement announcement. However, 
we also observe an increase in the rollover rate of Countrywide loans relative to the 
control group during the quarter immediately preceding the settlement announce-
ment. This pre-settlement increase is somewhat less evident when we subset on 
low utilization borrowers in panel B. When we consider low CLTV borrowers in 
panel C, we observe a substantial post-settlement increase in Countrywide’s roll-
over rate relative to the control group, but no visible  pre-settlement difference.
The patterns in Figure 4 suggest that the differential pre-settlement increase in 
Countrywide’s default rate is driven by high-risk loans, which are more concentrated 
in the Countrywide group (as Figure 3 showed). We explore this possibility by subset-
ting on Countrywide and control group loans with CLTVs, interest rates, and credit 
scores that were within one standard deviation of the corresponding Countrywide 
means during each month of the pre-settlement period. By trimming our sample in 
this way, we subset on relatively homogeneous loans and exclude  high-risk loans 
with extreme characteristics. We observe no differential  pre-settlement default pat-
terns in this sample, but continue to find that Countrywide’s rollover rate increased 
24 It might be thought that unobservable differences are potentially important because Countrywide was sued 
while other mortgage lenders and servicers were not. However, evidence presented by Lacko and Pappalardo (2007) 
suggests that Countrywide’s lending practices may not have differed substantially from those of other institutions. 
It appears that Countrywide was sued by state attorneys general because it was the largest originator and servicer 
of subprime mortgages and was still solvent at the time of the lawsuits (earlier in 2008, it had been acquired by 
Bank of America). Other originators, such as New Century and IndyMac, had already collapsed and either filed for 
bankruptcy or been placed into receivership by the federal government.
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 substantially relative to the control group immediately after the settlement announce-
ment (see Figure A.3 in the online Appendix). We also observe that Countrywide’s 
mean rollover rate reverts to the control group rate in early 2009.
This evidence suggests that the settlement induced an increase in Countrywide’s 
default rate and that the increase is concentrated in the first quarter immediately fol-
lowing the settlement announcement. Moreover, it indicates that differential patterns 
in pre-settlement mean default rates are driven by high-risk loans that are more heav-
ily concentrated in the Countrywide group. These patterns largely disappear, while 
the effect of the settlement persists, when we account for these high-risk tail loans.
B. Baseline Model of Settlement Effects
Table 2 implements equation (1) for 2/28 ARMs. Column 1 estimates the model 
using the full base sample, but includes minimal controls—time dummies, a 
Countrywide dummy, and interactions between the Countrywide and time dummies. 
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Figure 4. Evolution of Default Rates for 2/28 ARMs: Countrywide and Control Group
Notes: This figure plots the average monthly rollover rate (the 60-day delinquency rate among borrowers who were 
current two months before) during each of the five quarters preceding the settlement announcement, the quarter 
just after the announcement (Oct–Dec 2008), and the Jan–Feb 2009 period. Panel A plots the rate for all the loans, 
panel B subsets on borrowers with low credit utilization, and panel C subsets on borrowers whose mortgages had a 
CLTV less than 100 percent at the time of delinquency. The solid line shows the rollover rate for Countrywide loans 
while the dashed line shows the corresponding rate for mortgages in the control group.
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The time dummies identify the quarters before and after the settlement announce-
ment. The excluded category is Jul–Sept 2007, the first quarter of our analysis 
period. The final time dummy—Jan–Feb 2009—includes only two months because 
we stop our analysis in February 2009, the month before HAMP was announced. 
These Countrywide × Time interactions allow us to assess variation in the  relative 
default rates of Countrywide and control group loans before and after the settlement 
announcement.
The coefficients are marginal effects and can be compared to the mean monthly 
rollover rate among Countrywide loans during the Jul–Sep 2008 period, as reported 
Table 2—Default Specification for 2/28 ARMs
Base sample Base sample Matched sample Matched sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Countrywide × Oct–Dec 2007 −0.0012** −0.0005 0.0002 0.0004
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005)
Countrywide × Jan–Mar 2008 −0.0003 −0.0008 −0.0002 0.0002
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005)
Countrywide × Apr–Jun 2008 −0.0004 −0.0022*** −0.0018*** −0.0014** 
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Countrywide × Jul–Sep 2008 0.0056*** −0.0003 0.0001 0.0006
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Countrywide × Oct–Dec 2008 0.0160*** 0.0052*** 0.0048*** 0.0054*** 
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006)
Countrywide × Jan–Feb 2009 0.0092*** 0.0001 −0.0005 0.0005
(0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Countrywide −0.0002 0.0016*** 0.0017*** 0.0018*** 
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Origination quarter No Yes Yes Yes
BlackBox control No Yes Yes Yes
MSA control No Yes Yes Yes
Reset control No Yes Yes Yes
Equifax control No No No Yes
Number of cases 9,448,457 9,448,457 6,261,055 6,261,055
Avg. delinquency 2008:III 0.049 0.049 0.048 0.048
Average share Countrywide 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.18
Countrywide × (2008:IV–2008:III) 0.0104 0.0055 0.0047 0.0048
Wald Test ( p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Notes: This table reports estimates of probit specification (1) using data on Hybrid 2/28 ARMs. The dependent 
variable takes the value of one when a loan becomes 60 days past due in a given month, conditional upon being 
current 60 days earlier, and is equal to zero otherwise. Column 1 estimates the model using the base sample and 
includes only time dummies, a Countrywide dummy that equals one if the loan is serviced by Countrywide, and 
interactions between the Countrywide and time dummies. The excluded category is July–September 2007, the first 
quarter of our analysis period. Column 2 adds indicators for the quarter of origination and additional controls from 
the BlackBox data, including a wide range of loan and borrower-level characteristics, such as origination LTV, 
origination FICO and CLTV (when available), and their interactions with time dummies, initial interest rate, cur-
rent interest rate, reset controls capturing the timing of reset, and MSA fixed effects for the location of the property 
backing the loan. Columns 3 and 4 use the matched sample instead of the base sample. Column 3 includes the same 
controls as in column 2; column 4 includes additional Equifax controls, such as current CLTV, credit card utiliza-
tion, and current credit scores (Vantage) and their change over time. Coefficients reported are marginal effects from 
a probit regression; standard errors are in parentheses; standard errors are clustered at the loan ID.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
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at the bottom of the table (“Avg. delinquency”).25 In order to facilitate a direct assess-
ment of the change in rollover rates between the quarters before (Jul–Sep 2008) and 
after (Oct–Dec 2008) the announcement, the bottom of the table also reports the 
magnitude and statistical significance of the difference between the estimated inter-
actions, Countrywide × Jul–Sep 2008 and Countrywide × Oct–Dec 2008.
Column 2 adds additional controls from the BlackBox database. These controls 
include a wide range of loan- and borrower-level characteristics, such as origina-
tion FICO, initial LTV and CLTV (when available), current LTV, initial interest 
rate, and any change in rate over time. Column 2 also includes MSA fixed effects,26 
dummies that identify loans that had reset within the preceding three or six months, 
and interactions between these reset variables and the Countrywide dummy. These 
variables account for heterogeneity across loans and systematic differences between 
Countrywide and the control group, including the possibility that Countrywide 
mortgages experienced higher default rates at rate resets or during other time peri-
ods. Columns 3 and 4 analyze the matched sample: column 3 includes the same 
controls as in column 2; column 4 includes the set of Equifax controls, including 
information about second liens, credit card utilization, and current credit scores. 
Column 4 also uses current and origination CLTV.
Across all columns in Table 2, the Countrywide × Oct–Dec 2008 interaction is 
positive, statistically significant, and economically meaningful. Controlling for bor-
rower and loan characteristics, the estimates imply a 0.48 to 0.54 percentage point 
absolute increase in the monthly rollover rate of Countrywide loans, relative to the 
control group, during the quarter following the settlement announcement. This rep-
resents a 10 to 11 percent increase in Countrywide’s rollover rate relative to the 
average rate among Countrywide loans during the quarter immediately prior to the 
announcement (4.8 percent, as reported at the bottom of the table).27 Because the 
magnitude of the effect does not vary meaningfully across columns 2 through 4, we 
conclude that restricting our attention to the matched sample with a full set of con-
trols does not bias our inference.
As the unconditional mean default rates reported in Figure 4, the estimates in 
Table 2 point to a potential pre-settlement increase in Countrywide’s rollover 
rate relative to the control group. In column 1, the coefficient for Countrywide × 
Jul–Sep 2008 is substantial and statistically significant. When we add controls that 
account for heterogeneity in borrower and loan characteristics, the magnitude of 
this coefficient becomes much smaller and its significance disappears. The con-
trols that substantially reduce this coefficient are those that account for the current 
interest rate and its reset date, the current CLTV of the loan, and the borrower’s 
current credit score (See Table A.2 in the online Appendix). This confirms what 
we saw in the  univariate statistics: there are some differences in the  composition 
25 The estimated treatment effect in nonlinear difference-in-differences probit models such as ours is given by the 
incremental effect of the coefficient of the interaction term (see Kremer and Snyder 2010; Puhani 2012).
26 In unreported regressions, we obtained virtually identical results when we included both State dummies and 
State × Time interactions.
27 These estimates compare the quarter immediately after the announcement (the fourth quarter of 2008) to 
the first quarter of our analysis period (the third quarter of 2007). At the bottom of the table, we present estimates 
comparing the quarter immediately after to the quarter immediately before (third quarter of 2008). The results are 
similar: Estimates range from 0.48 to 0.55 percentage points, again representing a 10 to 11 percent increase relative 
to the rollover rate during the third quarter of 2008.
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of Countrywide and control group loans, especially with respect to high-risk 
loans. When we include a full battery of controls in column 4, all pre-settlement 
Countrywide × Time interactions are insignificant and small in magnitude except 
for the Countrywide × Apr–Jun 2008 interaction, which is marginally significant, 
negative, and small in magnitude.
Table 2 also shows that the settlement effect is concentrated in the first quar-
ter following its announcement. There is no apparent effect during Jan–Feb 2009. 
This pattern may reflect the way information about the Countrywide settlement was 
transmitted to borrowers. It was announced through media channels in early October 
2008 (Countrywide subsequently sent letters to borrowers beginning in December 
2008). If only a subset of Countrywide borrowers received news of the settlement, 
and responded quickly, we might not observe an effect in early 2009. In Section V 
we discuss the economic importance of our estimates and their implications.
Overall, this evidence is consistent with our analysis of mean rollover rates from 
the previous section: we find a substantial increase in the relative default rate of 
Countrywide loans immediately after the settlement. Although we also observe a 
pre-settlement relative increase in the Countrywide default rate, this effect disap-
pears when we control for loan characteristics.
C. Settlement Effects by Credit Card Utilization and CLTV
The baseline results displayed in Table 2 report a marked post-settlement increase 
in the rollover rate of Countrywide loans relative to the control group. This could 
reflect strategic behavior, or it could reflect an increase in defaults by economically 
distressed borrowers who were already highly likely to default in the near term. 
We address this concern by identifying subsets of borrowers who were unlikely to 
default in the absence of the settlement.
We stratify our sample by levels of credit card utilization and CLTV (both mea-
sured monthly). With respect to utilization, we identify three groups: borrow-
ers with access to credit equal to more than five months of mortgage payments 
(“> 5 Months”), those with available credit equal to one to five months of payments 
(“1–5 Months”), and those with available credit equal to no more the one payment 
(“0–1 Months”). We hypothesize that borrowers with high levels of available credit 
(e.g., “> 5 Months”) are likely to be less liquidity constrained and therefore less vul-
nerable to economic shocks than borrowers with lower levels of available credit.28
We similarly separate borrowers into three groups based on current CLTV: bor-
rowers with CLTV less than 100 (“above water”), those with CLTV between 100 and 
120, and those with CLTV greater than 120 (“underwater”). Again, we hypothesize 
that borrowers with CLTV under 100 are less likely to default because they have pos-
itive home equity. Finally, we identify a group of borrowers who had high  available 
credit (“> 5 Months”), but were underwater on their homes (“CLTV > 100”). These 
homeowners are often thought to be the most likely to engage in strategic behavior.
28 In unreported regressions we verify that our results are robust to different definitions of credit utilization. We 
reran our regressions separately on borrowers with zero to one month, one to two months, two to four months, four 
to six months, and six to twelve months of available credit. Consistent with Table 3, we find that the post-settlement 
relative increase in rollover rates among Countrywide loans is larger among borrowers with greater available credit.
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Table 3 reruns our main specification with the full set of controls (column 4 in 
Table 2) for each group of borrowers. Columns 1 through 3 separate borrowers 
by credit card utilization, 4 through 6 separate them by CLTV, and 7 subsets on 
underwater borrowers with high available utilization. As the bottom of the table 
shows (“Avg. Countrywide 2008:III delinquency”) pre-settlement rollover rates are 
 substantially lower among borrowers with lower CLTVs and higher levels of avail-
able credit. These patterns are consistent with our hypothesis that, prior to the settle-
ment, borrowers with substantial available credit and positive home equity were 
substantially less likely to default than more credit-constrained or “underwater” 
borrowers.
Table 3—Default Specification for 2/28 ARMs by Current Credit Utilization and CLTV
> 5 
months
1–5 
months
0–1 
months
CLTV < 
100
100 
≤ CLTV 
< 120
120 
≤ CLTV
> 5 months 
and CLTV 
> 100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Countrywide × −0.0004 0.0008 −0.0001 0.0011 −0.0011 −0.0059 −0.0026
 Oct–Dec 2007 (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0035) (0.0016)
Countrywide × 0.0012 0.0008 −0.0001 0.0013 −0.0008 −0.0054 −0.0006
 Jan–Mar 2008 (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0034) (0.0016)
Countrywide × 0.0003 −0.0014 −0.0014 −0.0009 −0.0032*** −0.0055 −0.0024
 Apr–Jun 2008 (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0033) (0.0015)
Countrywide × 0.0011 0.0018 0.0015 0.0009 −0.0011 0.0007 −0.0011
 Jul–Sep 2008 (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0031) (0.0015)
Countrywide × 0.0054*** 0.0052*** 0.0063*** 0.0050*** 0.0038*** 0.0076 0.0049** 
 Oct–Dec 2008 (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0039) (0.0021)
Countrywide × 0.0002 0.0009 0.0015 0.0049*** −0.0004 −0.0029 −0.0028
 Jan–Feb 2009 (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0035) (0.0017)
Countrywide −0.0001 0.0011 0.0025*** 0.0005 0.0040*** 0.0078** 0.0025
(0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0035) (0.0016)
Origination quarter Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
BlackBox control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reset control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Equifax control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,210,922 1,639,789 1,748,890 1,994,158 1,715,891 1,067,641 611,797
Avg. share Countrywide 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.20
Avg. Countrywide  
 2008:III delinquency
0.030 0.041 0.052 0.031 0.039 0.078 0.040
Countrywide ×  
 (2008:IV–2008:III)
0.0043 0.0034 0.0048 0.0041 0.0049 0.0069 0.006
Wald Test ( p-value) 0.0000 0.0019 0.0001 0.0010 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
Notes: This table reports estimates of probit specification (1) for Hybrid 2/28 ARMs, but stratifies the Matched 
Sample by borrowers current credit utilization and CLTV. The models are estimated using the full set of BlackBox 
and Equifax controls used in column 4 of Table 2. The dependent variable takes the value of one if the loan becomes 
60 days past due in a given month, conditional upon being current 60 days earlier, and is equal to zero otherwise. 
The excluded category is July–September 2007, the first quarter of our analysis period. Columns 1 through 3 sepa-
rate borrowers by available credit card utilization, 4 through 6 separate them by CLTV, and 7 subsets on underwater 
borrowers with high available credit utilization. Coefficients reported are marginal effects from a probit regression; 
standard errors are in parentheses; standard errors are clustered at the loan ID.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
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Across columns 1 through 7, we observe a substantial post-settlement increase in 
Countrywide’s relative rollover rate. Stratifying borrowers by credit card utilization, 
columns 1 through 3 show that the relative effect of the settlement was largest among 
borrowers with the most available credit. Among borrowers with “> 5 Months” of 
available credit, Countrywide’s monthly rollover rate increased by 0.54 percentage 
points. This represents an 18 percent increase relative to the pre-settlement rate. 
Among borrowers in the “1–5 Months” and “0 –1 Months” categories, the estimates 
represent 13 and 12 percent relative increases, respectively.29
We observe similar patterns when we stratify loans by CLTV in columns 4 through 
6. Countrywide’s relative rollover rate increased by 0.50 percentage points among 
“above-water” borrowers with CLTV < 100, a 16 percent increase compared to the 
pre-settlement rollover rate. We also observe a relative increase in defaults during 
January–February 2009 among borrowers with CLTV < 100.30 The estimates for 
underwater borrowers—0.38 and 0.76 percentage point effects—represent 10 per-
cent increases relative to the pre-settlement default rate (and the effect is only 
marginally significant for borrowers with CLTV > 120).31 Column 7 of Table 3 
provides evidence that the settlement induced an increase in Countrywide’s rela-
tive rollover rate among underwater borrowers with substantial available credit. The 
0.49 percentage point effect translates into a 12 percent increase compared to the 
pre-settlement delinquency rate among Countrywide loans.32
Overall, these results support our hypothesis that the settlement induced defaults 
among borrowers who were unlikely to default otherwise, at least in the near future. 
Equally important, as we look across the columns in Table 3, we do not find signifi-
cant evidence of differential pre-settlement default patterns. This is consistent with 
our previous findings, which indicate that these patterns are driven by Countrywide 
high-risk loans and that, once we control for these loans or consider a more homog-
enous sample of mortgages, these patterns are no longer evident.
D. Effects of the Settlement on Nontargeted Debts
The settlement targeted subprime first lien mortgages. We do not expect to observe 
an increase in defaults among nontargeted debts—such as second lien mortgages 
and credit card debt—in response to the settlement. Similarly, we do not expect 
the settlement announcement to affect default behavior of borrowers who were not 
eligible for benefits, such as borrowers with non-subprime mortgages. Although the 
29 The magnitude of the post-settlement increase is slightly smaller when we compute the estimated change 
between the quarters immediately before and after the settlement. As reported at the bottom of Table 3, the absolute 
increase is 0.43 percentage points among borrowers with “> 5 Months” of available credit, a 14 percent increase 
relative to the pre-settlement mean. Among borrowers in the other categories, the increase is smaller—an 8 per-
cent increase among borrowers in the “1–5 Months” category and a 9 percent increase among borrowers in the 
“0–1 Months” category.
30 Borrowers with lower CLTV levels may have taken more time to respond, possibly as their perceived cost of 
strategic behavior was higher.
31 When we compute the difference between the estimated coefficients for Countrywide × Oct–Dec 2008 and 
Countrywide × Jul–Sep 2008 (the quarters before and after the settlement), we obtain comparable results, as shown 
at the bottom of Table 3. Among above-water borrowers, we observe a 13 percent increase in Countrywide’s relative 
rollover rate compared to the pre-settlement mean. Borrowers with CLTV above 120 exhibit an increase of only 
9 percent.
32 The effect is even larger—15 percent compared to the pre-settlement mean—when we compare the estimated 
coefficients for Countrywide × Oct–Dec 2008 and Countrywide × Jul–Sep 2008, as the bottom of Table 3 shows.
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settlement offered relief to subprime fixed-rate mortgage (FRM) borrowers, the vast 
majority of securitized FRMs in our data are  non-subprime loans offered to borrow-
ers with relatively high credit ratings. Because these  non-subprime FRMs were not 
targeted by the settlement, they provide a useful placebo test.
Table 4 tests these hypotheses. Columns 1 and 2 reestimate our main specifica-
tion, but change the dependent variable to measure the probability of being  60 days 
past due on a second lien (column 1) or missing a payment on credit card debt (col-
umn 2), conditional upon being current two months earlier. Borrowers are included 
in these regressions only if they have a second lien or credit card. Across both col-
umns, we observe no effect of the settlement on the relative delinquency rate of 
Countrywide borrowers, consistent with the hypothesis that the settlement did not 
induce defaults on nontargeted debts.33
Columns 3 and 4 rerun these regressions on subsets of borrowers with high avail-
able credit (> 5 Months) and borrowers with above-water mortgages (CLTV < 100). 
Although these borrowers had the lowest default rates on first mortgages prior to 
the settlement announcement, as Table 3 showed, their rollover rates exhibited the 
strongest response to the announcement. Yet we find no evidence that the settlement 
increased delinquency rates on nontargeted debts among these borrowers, relative 
to control group. To the contrary, column 4 shows that credit card delinquency rates 
decreased among low utilization Countrywide borrowers, relative to the control 
group, after the settlement announcement. This pattern suggests that some borrow-
ers may have strategically defaulted on first mortgages and then used the additional 
available cash flow to service credit card debts. With respect to second liens, we 
observe a similar pattern, though the effects are not significant except in Jan–Feb 
2009. These results suggest that the settlement may have induced behavior that 
effectively reverses the priorities of first and second liens: Countrywide borrowers 
continued making payments on lower-priority second liens loans while defaulting 
on more senior loans.34
Finally, column 7 estimates our main specification using data on non-subprime 
fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs). Again, we observe no increase in rollover rates among 
Countrywide borrowers, relative to the control group, during the months following 
the settlement announcement. Indeed, relative rollover rates appear to have declined 
among these Countrywide borrowers during those months.35
33 This evidence also suggests that the delinquency induced by the Countrywide program did not shift the “moral 
compass” of borrowers by encouraging them to default on other types of debt.
34 We also estimated a version of our main specification in which the dependent variable equals 1 if the borrower 
becomes 60 days delinquent, conditional upon being current 2 months earlier, while remaining current on credit 
cards for at least 6 months following the month in which he or she becomes 60 days delinquent. This dependent vari-
able measures a type of default behavior—defaulting on first mortgages while remaining current on other debts—
that others have described as “strategic behavior.” We observe a substantial increase in this type of default among 
Countrywide borrowers, relative to the control group during the quarter following the settlement announcement. 
The effect is larger when we subset on borrowers with more available credit or those with  above-water mortgages.
35 We have also investigated the program response among Countrywide subprime FRMs that were targeted by 
the settlement. For that purpose, we define an FRM loan as subprime if the borrower’s origination FICO was less 
than 620. We find some evidence that Countrywide subprime FRMs experienced a relative increase in delinquency 
rates after the announcement, but our estimates are imprecise because we have only about 10,000 Countrywide 
subprime FRMs in our data (compared to more than 130,000 non-subprime FRMs).
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E. Additional Robustness Checks
Extending the Analysis Period.—In the foregoing analysis, we analyze default 
rates until February 2009, but do not consider data from subsequent months in order 
to avoid the potential confound created by the HAMP program. The downside of 
this approach is that it leaves open the possibility that the settlement merely acceler-
ated defaults that would have happened later in time. If that were true, the relative 
increase in Countrywide’s rollover rate in fourth quarter 2008 should be offset by 
relative decreases in subsequent quarters. We explore this possibility by  extending 
Table 4—Default Specifications for Other Debt Types
5+ months utilization CLTV < 100
2nd 
lien 
Credit 
card 
2nd 
lien 
Credit 
card 
2nd 
lien
Credit 
card 
Non-
subprime 
FRM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Countrywide × Oct–Dec 2007 0.0002 −0.0016 −0.0011 −0.0026 0.0001 −0.0009 0.0000(0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0017) (0.0006) (0.0020) (0.0000)
Countrywide × Jan–Mar 2008 0.0012 0.0009 −0.0009 −0.0030 0.0011 0.0039 0.0003***(0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0018) (0.0011) (0.0025) (0.0000)
Countrywide × Apr–Jun 2008 −0.0000 0.0004 −0.0018 −0.0022 −0.0002 0.0013 0.0003***(0.0000) (0.0015) (0.0010) (0.0020) (0.0010) (0.0030) (0.0001)
Countrywide × Jul–Sep 2008 0.0004 −0.0001 −0.0016 −0.0016 0.0013 −0.0000 0.0000(0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0020) (0.0014) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Countrywide × Oct–Dec 2008 0.0004 −0.0018 −0.0018 −0.0047** −0.0002 0.0011 −0.0002***(0.0009) (0.0016) (0.0011) (0.0021) (0.0012) (0.0037) (0.0000)
Countrywide × Jan–Feb 2009 −0.0003 −0.0016 −0.0031*** −0.0033 0.0017 0.0071 −0.0002***(0.0081) (0.0019) (0.0010) (0.0026) (0.0019) (0.0051) (0.0000)
Countrywide 0.0018** −0.0014 0.0033** 0.0033 0.0001 −0.0026 0.0004***
(0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0005) (0.0018) (0.0000)
Origination quarter Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
BlackBox control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reset control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Equifax control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,906,151 3,230,307 525,191 903,902 265,800 870,999 8,920,874
Avg. share Countrywide 0.20 0.18 0.21 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.30
Avg. Countrywide  
 2008:III delinquency
0.028 0.073 0.021 0.045 0.010 0.082 0.0090
Countrywide × 
 (2008:IV–2008:III)
0.0000 −0.0017 −0.0002 −0.0031 −0.0015 0.0011 −0.0002
Wald Test ( p-value) 0.94 0.28 0.83 0.12 0.31 0.77 0.0000
Notes: This table reports estimates from models similar to probit specification (1), but with the dependent vari-
able measuring delinquency on loans that were not targeted by the settlement. The models are estimated using the 
matched sample and the full set of BlackBox and Equifax controls used in column 4 of Table 2. In column 1 below, 
the dependent variable equals one if the borrower becomes 60 days past due on a second lien, conditional upon 
being current two months earlier, and equals zero otherwise. In column 2, the dependent variable equals one if the 
borrower becomes delinquent on credit card debt, conditional upon being current two months earlier, and equals 
zero otherwise. Columns 3–6 show the corresponding results after subsetting on borrowers with low credit utili-
zation (columns 3 and 4) and CLTV < 100 (columns 5 and 6). Column 7 uses data on borrowers with fixed-rate 
mortgages (FRMs). The dependent variable equals one if the borrower becomes 60 days past due on a FRM, condi-
tional upon being current two months earlier, and equals zero otherwise. Across all columns, the excluded category 
is July–September 2007, the first quarter of our analysis period. Coefficients reported are marginal effects from a 
probit regression; standard errors are in parentheses; standard errors are clustered at the loan ID.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
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our analysis through December 2009. We observe a relative increase in the esti-
mated Countrywide’s rollover rate immediately after the settlement announce-
ment, as reflected in the Countrywide × Oct–Dec 2008 interaction, but none of 
the subsequent Countrywide × Quarter interactions is negative and significant (see 
Figure A.4 in the online Appendix). This is inconsistent with the hypothesis that the 
settlement merely accelerated defaults that would have occurred anyway in the near 
term. Instead, these results indicate that the settlement induced a net increase in the 
stock of delinquent Countrywide loans and that this increase did not quickly reverse 
itself over time.
Alternative Modeling Strategies.—Our empirical strategy models the probability 
that a loan becomes 60 days delinquent in month t, conditional upon being current 
in month t − 2. Because of this restriction, we are not estimating a standard hazard 
model. As we discussed above, we chose this specification because we believe that 
evidence of strategic behavior is more compelling if we observe a relative increase 
in Countrywide borrowers who abruptly defaulted on their loans but were current on 
their payments before they received news of the settlement. This specification also 
subsets on a relatively homogeneous group of borrowers, all of whom were current 
two months before the month of interest.
We confirmed, however, that a standard hazard model yields comparable results. 
Following Grogger and Bronars (2001) and DeCicca, Kenkel, and Mathios (2002), 
we estimated a version of our baseline specification—column 4 of Table 2—in which 
the dependent variable equals 1 when a loan becomes 60 days delinquent (without 
conditioning on being previously current). Once a loan becomes 60 days delinquent, 
it drops out of our sample. We account for possible duration dependence by including 
dummies for origination quarter and current quarter (which were already included 
in our baseline specification) and by including controls for loan age and loan age 
squared. This specification is a discrete-time hazard model. Estimating this specifica-
tion, we find that Countrywide loans exhibit a relative increase in the hazard of being 
60 days delinquent immediately after the settlement announcement. The magnitudes 
are similar to those reported in Table 2 (see Figure A.5 in the online Appendix).36
Alternative Control Groups.—Our empirical strategy treats all non-Countrywide 
loans as a control group. It is possible that our analysis is confounded by  differential 
changes in default trends among particular loan servicers within the control group. 
To address this possibility, we reran our main specification—column 4 of Table 2—
but included dummies that identify loans serviced by the top five non-Countrywide 
servicers and interacted these dummies with pre- and post-settlement time dum-
mies. The remaining loans were left in the control group. Although we continue 
to find a strong effect of the settlement among Countrywide loans, we observe no 
impact among loans serviced by the top five non-Countrywide Servicers, support-
ing our empirical design. As an additional placebo test, we reran our specifica-
tion, but dropped Countrywide loans and replaced the Countrywide indicator with 
an  indicator for loans serviced by Wells Fargo, the second largest servicer in our 
36 We obtain similar results when we reestimate this specification using a complementary log-log regression, 
which is equivalent to a discrete-time proportional hazard model.
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dataset. We find no meaningful  post-settlement increase in the relative default rate 
among Wells Fargo loans.
Alternative Approaches to Time-Varying Effects.—Our estimates in Table 2 
report an average settlement effect across all loan vintages. The settlement, how-
ever, could have impacted some loan vintages differently than others. For example, 
it may have been most beneficial to borrowers experiencing interest rate resets 
before or around the time the settlement was announced. To explore this possibil-
ity, we reran our main specification from Table 2 for each quarterly origination 
cohort. Despite a relatively small sample size for each cohort, we observe a statisti-
cally significant  post-settlement relative increase in the Countrywide default rate 
both in cohorts that were resetting around the time of the settlement (2006:II and 
2006:III) and in cohorts that reset more than a year before the settlement announce-
ment (2005:I, 2005:II, and 2006:I). The effects range from more than 10 percent 
to more than 20 percent compared to the pre-settlement delinquency rate among 
Countrywide loans.
Additionally, our empirical specifications use quarterly time effects. This allows 
us to estimate the settlement effect with greater power, avoiding some of the issues 
associated with noisy variation in monthly default rates. We verified, however, that 
our results are robust to the way we model time effects. For example, we reestimated 
our main specification, but replaced the quarterly dummies with monthly dummies, 
which were interacted with the Countrywide indicator. Consistent with our prior 
results, we observe a substantial increase in Countrywide’s rollover rate during 
November and December 2008 (see Figure A.6 in the online Appendix).
V. Conclusion
We investigate whether homeowners respond strategically to news of mortgage 
modification programs by defaulting on their mortgages. We analyze a program that 
used a simple eligibility criterion: A borrower becomes eligible upon default. We 
find that this program induced an increase in defaults. The borrowers whose esti-
mated default rates increased the most were those who appear to have been the least 
likely to default otherwise.
“Back-of-the-envelope” calculations suggest that the estimated effects of strategic 
behavior could be economically meaningful. Over 45 million first-lien mortgages 
were outstanding and current in early 2007, when housing prices began to fall.37 
Suppose lenders considered at that time whether to implement a national mortgage 
modification program with simple eligibility criteria similar to the Countrywide set-
tlement. The estimates in Table 2 imply that the Countrywide settlement resulted in 
a 0.54 percentage point absolute increase in the monthly delinquency rate during the 
quarter immediately after its announcement. This means that 1.62 percent of current 
loans became delinquent during this quarter as a result of the settlement announce-
ment. Applying that estimate (1.62 percent) to the stock of outstanding, current 
37 Based on LPS and BlackBox databases.
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loans (45 million), a national program would immediately induce over 700,000 
additional strategic defaults.38
If the typical loan modification offered debt relief equivalent to about 30 per-
cent of a borrower’s outstanding loan balance (with an average balance of about 
$200,000), strategic defaults would impose losses of over $43 billion on mortgage 
lenders and investors (in terms of foregone payments from borrowers).39 If programs 
with simple eligibility criteria have longer-run impacts on strategic default rates—
which we cannot assess due to the limits of our empirical setting—the losses would 
be larger. On the other hand, we note that such long-term costs could also be lower 
if some of the strategic defaulters would have defaulted anyway at some point in the 
future. Likewise, because the Countrywide settlement compensated borrowers who 
allegedly suffered deception, the borrowers may have felt entitled to take advantage 
of the program in a way that wouldn’t occur in a program with different origin.
With these caveats in mind, we can use our rough cost estimate to explore the 
potential trade-off facing mortgage lenders (and investors). Simple modification 
programs can result in strategic behavior leading to unnecessary modifications. On 
the other hand, if lenders try to avoid these losses by implementing slower programs 
with more complex eligibility criteria, they may fail to prevent foreclosures that also 
reduce payoffs to lenders (and homeowners). To illustrate this trade-off, assume that 
a foreclosure results in losses to lenders equal to about 50 percent of the borrower’s 
outstanding loan balance.40 Assume as well that foreclosures can be prevented by 
offering homeowners debt relief equivalent to about 30 percent of their balances. 
Unnecessary foreclosures, then, expose lenders to losses equal to 20 percent of the 
borrower’s outstanding balance. Unnecessary modifications, by contrast, expose 
them to losses equal to 30 percent of the borrower’s outstanding balance. A simple 
calculation indicates that lenders would be indifferent between a quick program 
generating over 700,000 unnecessary modifications and a slow program generating 
over one million unnecessary foreclosures. Both programs generate the same costs 
to lenders. This example suggests that concerns about strategic defaults may help 
explain the relatively slow pace of mortgage modifications during the recent crisis.41
Could lenders alleviate costs of strategic behavior by using our proxies—high 
available credit utilization and low current CLTV—to identify borrowers who are 
more likely to be acting strategically in response to a mortgage modification pro-
gram? There are a number of challenges in applying these proxies to design more 
cost-effective modification programs. First, available utilization is manipulable: 
Borrowers can strategically increase their credit utilization in order to qualify for 
38 A similar increase in strategic defaults is implied by our estimates in Table 3, which subsets on less-risky 
borrowers with relatively high remaining credit card utilization and lower CLTV ratios. This implies that our back-
of-the envelope calculations are unlikely to be biased by the relatively low average creditworthiness of Countrywide 
borrowers.
39 We assume a loan modification equal to 30 percent of a borrower’s outstanding loan balance because home 
prices fell over 30 percent after mid-2007, according to the Case-Shiller ten-city composite index (Sinai 2013). A 
modification of the magnitude we contemplate here would allow most homeowners to become above-water on their 
mortgages.
40 This loss arises from (i) the house price decline that has already occurred and (ii) the deadweight costs of the 
foreclosure process.
41 There are other factors that could adversely affect mortgage renegotiation such as institutional frictions implied 
by the high rate of securitization of loans at risk of foreclosure (see Piskorski, Seru, and Vig 2010 and Agrawal et 
al. 2011) or limited ability of servicers to handle distressed loans (Agrawal et al. 2012).
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benefits. Second, although CLTV is less manipulable than utilization, it is harder 
to verify and often measured with noise, particularly for homes that haven’t experi-
enced recent transactions. As a result, a policy that makes benefits available only to 
borrowers with high estimated CLTVs could prevent some eligible borrowers from 
obtaining relief.42
The above rough calculations show that the costs associated with strategic 
default—even if relatively small compared to the amount of mortgage debt out-
standing—may be large enough to induce lenders to favor slower, more cautious 
debt relief programs, which fail to prevent many foreclosures. Such foreclosures, 
however, can yield negative externalities for surrounding communities, as illus-
trated by Campbell, Giglio, and Pathak (2011) and Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi (2011). 
Additionally, debt-relief programs may mitigate the distorting effects of high house-
hold debt levels on aggregate demand, investment decisions, and employment (Mian 
and Sufi 2012).
Our analysis does not necessarily imply that it would be socially optimal to incen-
tivize or require lenders to implement generous modification programs. These pro-
grams could generate other costs or undesirable redistributional effects that we have 
not studied here. Our results instead highlight a trade-off that merits further inves-
tigation: Mortgage modification policies that use simple but potentially manipu-
lable eligibility criteria (i) do appear to generate economically meaningful strategic 
behavior, but (ii) may also offer benefits more quickly and to a larger group of 
homeowners at risk of default. More work must be done to assess the overall costs 
and benefits of such modification policies both in the near term and in the long run.
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